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Abstract—With increasing usage of mobile telephony, and
the trend towards additional mobile Internet usage, privacy
and anonymity become more and more important. Previously-
published anonymous communication schemes aim to obscure
their users’ network addresses, because real-world identity can be
easily be derived from this information. We propose modiﬁcations
to a novel call-management architecture, the Digital Marketplace,
which will break this link, therefore enabling truly anonymous
network access.
I. INTRODUCTION
Anonymous communication has been of interest to re-
searchers for many years. The most basic goal of this research
is to allow message sending without revealing the identity of
the sender. Several schemes exist in the literature which meet
this aim under certain circumstances, many of which also con-
ceal other information about the communication[1][2][3][4].
One assumption common to all of these proposals is that a
person’s identity is deﬁned as their network address. Currently,
this is accurate: for example, in many countries Internet Ser-
vice Providers are legally obliged to divulge to the authorities
any information which ties a network address to one of
their customers. Since network addresses are assigned by the
network service provider, this applies to all ﬁxed and mobile
Internet communications. From a privacy standpoint, it would
be far preferable to remove this link between network address
and anonymity at source, thus greatly reducing the impact of
failure of a higher-layer anonymity protocol.
The Digital Marketplace (DMP) is a next-generation call
management architecture which enables free-market compe-
tition for connectivity on a per-call basis[5]. Recent work
presents an analysis of the many security issues inherent
with the architecture[6], and a series of modiﬁcations which
ensure secure operation[7]. In this paper, we propose further
modiﬁcations which would allow DMP users to place bids and
receive service without revealing any identifying information,
therefore enabling truly anonymous network access.
II. ANONYMOUS NETWORK ACCESS
Many anonymous communication protocols are based on
mix networks[8]. The core principle of such protocols is
simple: sending an encrypted message on an unpredictable
path makes it difﬁcult for an observer to determine the sender.
Additions to this technique include: padding the message to
stop attackers gaining information from the content length[3];
sending false trafﬁc to ensure that eavesdroppers cannot prove
that a message was sent at all[9]; higher-level protocol inspec-
tion to prevent timing attacks based on multiple requests[4].
The threat models of these protocols have several features
in common. The most clear commonality is that the identity
of the user is tied to the network address, and therefore the
address is the information that the protocol tries to obfuscate.
This is most crucial in the failure case: when the network
address is discovered by an attacker, it is often trivial to link
this to a real-world identity.
Additionally, even when using anonymous communication
schemes, the network operator is in a position to record
communications metadata: for example, time of transmission;
or in mobile systems, the user’s location. These data can
be analysed to track the user’s communication habits and
whereabouts, revealing still more information which many
people feel should be private. Recently, mobile network op-
erators have faced public criticism over handling of their
customers’ personal information: examples include secretive
location-tracking services in the UK[10], and cell phone call
records in the USA[11].
Therefore, we believe that it is desirable to break the link
between network address and identity, which is only feasible
with wireless network access. This would provide a solid
foundation on which to build a series of privacy measures,
including using the anonymity networks discussed above. With
no ability to determine a user’s identity given their network
address, the consequences of failure of the anonymity scheme
are much less signiﬁcant. Furthermore, allowing users to
fully hide their identities from their network service provider
allows a fundamentally new perspective on anonymity: instead
of normally being identiﬁable, users can be anonymous by
default, and will remain so unless they reveal identifying
information. This circumvents the problem of the increasingly-
untrustworthy network operator, using technical rather than
legal methods.
III. DIGITAL MARKETPLACE
As mobile systems evolve beyond the third generation,
new challenges arise in network service provision. Users will
request access to a diverse range of services, which will
cause increasing demands on the network. Higher capacities
will force a move to environment-optimised air interfaces and
smaller cell sizes. Current call management architectures are
insufﬁciently ﬂexible to cope with these changes.
One solution to this problem is to employ a market-based
middleware. The Digital Marketplace proposal introduces the
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Fig. 1. Organisation of agents in the Digital Marketplace, represented as a simpliﬁed protocol diagram
A
Message from A to B
B
Logical Market Channel
Fixed Network
Agent Marketplace Platform
Wireless Access Network
LegendUTA MA SPA
LA NA 1 NA n…MA SPA
CONNECT
MIGRATE
JOIN
BID
ESTABLISH
…
RELEASE
TERMINATE
REPUTATION UPDATE
SESSION REPORT
LEAVE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
11
FLOW CONTRACT
LIST QUERY
LIST INFORM
ACCEPT
SESSION REPORT
FLOW CONTRACT
LIST INFORM
LIST INFORM
LIST INFORM
FLOW CONTRACT
BID
AUCTION REPORT
AUCTION REPORT
AUCTION REPORT
8
12
13
14
15
Fig. 2. Secure Digital Marketplace protocol operation; see also section III-B
concept of a market channel, across which auctions for service
contracts are conducted[12]. This allows many independent
network operators to supply network connectivity, via service
providers, to mobile users. With correct protocol design and
implementation, a freely-operating market can be achieved[5].
It is argued that this will optimally and fairly allocate network
resources.
A. Overview
Consider a mobile user who wishes to initiate a commu-
nications session. The user’s terminal scans radio channels,
seeking a marketplace channel broadcast signal. Once the
market is located, the terminal transmits a session contract
stating quality and price requirements, either to make a new
call or initiate a registration and paging contract. This allows
Digital Marketplace users to both make outgoing and receive
incoming calls. The market operator agent (MA) forwards this
request to the user’s service provider (SPA), which then enters
the agent marketplace platform to negotiate on behalf of the
user. Registered network operator agents (NAs) propose bids
on the contract tenders, and the service provider selects those
which best match the requirements. Each network operator has
a market reputation, based on how well it has previously met
its contract requirements; this is considered in the selection
process, and is updated after every session. See ﬁgure 1 for
an overview of the marketplace organisation.
B. Current Protocol Operation
Previous work has outlined the Digital Marketplace protocol
operation[7]. The sequence of interactions in the protocol
session is given below, and in ﬁgure 2.
1: User Terminal Agent (UTA) makes a connection request
to the Market Agent (MA). The request includes the network
address of the user’s service provider, and a session contract.
2: MA forwards the contract to the service provider, including
the network location of the marketplace, and the address of
the Logging Agent (LA). 3: The service provider migrates a
negotiation agent (SPA) with the contract to the marketplace.
4: SPA veriﬁes that the LA is running on a secure platform,
then requests the list of Network Agents (NAs) and their
reputations. The LA responds with the list. 5: SPA analyses
the session contract, creates a ﬂow contract, and forwards the
ﬂow contract to the LA. The LA forwards the ﬂow contract
to all subscribing NAs.
6: NAs calculate their commitments, and make appropriate
bids. 7: SPA selects the most suitable bid(s), based on price,
quality, and network operator reputation, and informs the
winning NAs of acceptance. 8: NAs conﬁrm to the UTA that
the ﬂows are established.
9: At the end of the session, the UTA releases each ﬂow.
10: NAs inform the SPA of end of session. 11: NAs and the
UTA report commitment fulﬁlment to the MA. 12: The MA
updates the reputations of the two reporting parties, and sends
the new reputations to the LA. 13: The LA forwards the new
list of NAs and reputations to subscribing parties. 14: The SPA
decrypts and sends all bids to the LA. The LA forwards the
bids to subscribing parties, to allow them to verify the fairness
of the auction. 15: SPA exits the marketplace.
IV. ACHIEVING ANONYMOUS NETWORK ACCESS
We want to achieve two properties of private communica-
tions: unidentiﬁability and unlinkability[13]. Unidentiﬁability
can be achieved if no other party in the DMP is able to derive
a user’s identity from a network address. Unlinkability can be
achieved if no actor in the DMP can observe any relationship
between two subsequent calls made by one user. If these goals
are achieved, the Digital Marketplace can be used to enable
anonymous network access.
A. Unidentiﬁability
A
A certiﬁes B's identity
B
Legend
A trusts B to certify
MA
SPA
NA 1 NA 2 NA n…
TTP
Fig. 3. Certiﬁcation and trust in the Digital Marketplace
As can be seen from ﬁgure 1, the Digital Marketplace
does not fundamentally change the traditional relationship
between the mobile terminal user and the service provider.
The service provider is still the user’s representative in the
market, knows the identity of the user, and maintains a long-
term relationship. Clearly, we cannot provide unidentiﬁability
while this relationship exists.
However, the DMP demands that an agent is present in
the marketplace to negotiate for network service. Therefore,
we propose modifying the DMP speciﬁcation to permit user-
submitted agents to take the role of the SPA. These User
Negotiation Agents (UNAs) would have to comply with the
DMP protocols, and be compatible with the DMP Agent
Environment, but may otherwise operate however the user
desires. One possibility is a standard Open Source UNA, which
would allow the user to verify that the agent does not violate
its privacy. Making this change also creates other possibilities
for the Digital Marketplace, unrelated to privacy concerns: for
example, users could modify the negotiation behaviour of their
agent to exactly suit their requirements.
We propose modifying the initial Connect message to in-
clude an optional parameter: the code of the UNA. There-
fore, as indicated in ﬁgure 4, the UNA is migrated into the
marketplace via the Market Agent. For anonymous users, this
removes the need for steps 2 and 3 in the previously-described
protocol (see section III-B).
Figure 3 shows that the SPA has its identity certiﬁed by
a Trusted Third Party in the DMP, but also that it is not
in a position of trust. As described in previous research[7],
certiﬁcation is necessary to give network operators a course
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Fig. 4. Integration of UNA into the Digital Marketplace: the UNA is migrated in the Connect message
of action if a service provider fails to pay for network
connectivity provided to its users. This facilitates the standard
telephony model of “payment in arrears”: service is used, and
paid for in aggregate at the end of the billing period. However,
this is the only reason for certiﬁcation.
The UNA cannot be certiﬁed, as this would enable linking
of multiple calls, defeating anonymity. Therefore, to allow
a UNA to function in place of an SPA, we require pre-
payment. This is an unavoidable consequence of anonymous
service usage: with user anonymity, there is nowhere to send
a bill, and no practical incentive to pay after the service
has been provided. As the Digital Marketplace is an online
marketplace, we propose the use of electronic cash[14] as a
payment mechanism.
Users will often not be able to specify in advance how much
they want to use the network. Therefore, we cannot pay fully
in advance, as even after negotiations we do not know what
the ﬁnal charge will be. To solve this problem, we require a
scheme which supports micropayments[15], to allow the user
to pay in advance for network usage by throughput or time
in small units. For example, the market negotiation could lead
to a contract of 50 cents per megabyte of data transfer; then,
the user would pay 50 cents up-front for the ﬁrst megabyte,
and make another payment if that limit was reached. There
are several examples of anonymous micropayment systems in
the literature[16][17], some of which are currently available
commercially[18].
At ﬁrst glance, another issue seems to arise from allowing
unsigned SPAs to negotiate in the DMP. The SPA’s certiﬁcation
is also used to ensure that detected unfair bid selection is
punishable, to counter collusion. With an unsigned UNA, this
cannot be punished. However, we do not expect this to be a
major problem, for two reasons. Firstly, individual users have
no motive to select anything but the most competitive bid;
therefore, when the unsigned UNA chooses between bids, the
selection will be fair. Secondly, we expect that the free market
will adapt to ensure that the less trustworthy anonymous
transactions incur a premium, due to increased risk on the part
of the network operators. Therefore, it would not be a sensible
business strategy for a service provider to present an unsigned
agent to the marketplace, in order to collude with network
operators without punishment. The associated increase in call
cost should ensure that this approach would lead to higher
costs to the user, and therefore the service provider would
become uncompetitive.
B. Unlinkability
The modiﬁcations proposed in the previous section allow
users to gain network access without directly revealing their
identities. However, to achieve anonymity, we must also ensure
that there are no detectable links between two separate Digital
Marketplace interactions. Without such a property, long-term
proﬁling is possible, which can eventually lead to identiﬁca-
tion.
To achieve unlinkability, we must remove any possible links
between sessions. For this paper, we exclude any application-
level information disclosure; it is assumed that the user will
use higher-layer anonymity schemes as appropriate to counter
this problem. In this paper, we only examine in depth the
Digital Marketplace protocols. We therefore also assume that
the only adversaries are the network operators; both the Market
Agent and Logging Agent are veriﬁably trustable[7], and no
other agents have any interaction with the UNA.
A diagrammatic representation of the Digital Marketplace
protocol is given in ﬁgure 2. From ﬁgures 1 and 4 it is clear
that the second and third steps of the protocol are elided when
using a UNA; the agent code is already present in the agent
platform, as part of the Connect message.
Almost all messages sent by the UNA clearly provide no
opportunity for proﬁling, with the exception of bid selection
and ﬂow contract proposal. Since the bid selection behaviour
is opaque, and the algorithm used may be complex, we assume
that it is unfeasible to identify a unique UNA from bid choice
alone. Similarly, parameters in the ﬂow contract are likely to
be similar for all agents, with random variation depending on
network conditions; this again prevents proﬁling.
However, the mobile agent itself may be different, especially
if the user customises its behaviour. The secure agent execu-
tion environment ensures that the agent code is unreadable
by the network agents; therefore, the only place that the
agent code could be read by the Network Operators is in
the connect message. We therefore propose that the connect
message should padded to a ﬁxed length, and encrypted so that
only the MA may read it. This implies that the UNA must be of
a ﬁxed size; restrictions on the agent’s operation are necessary
to ensure efﬁcient operation of the agent environment, so it is
not onerous to constrain its size. The value for the agent’s
maximum size is an implementation-speciﬁc issue.
Finally, one other possibility for linking several sessions
exists. We assume that all local wireless networks used by the
Digital Marketplace require hardware addresses for clients; for
example, the MAC address in 802.11. This is observable by
anyone accessing the network, and is normally never changed.
It therefore provides a very simple method for tracking users
over multiple sessions.
Previous work by Tortonesi and Davoli discussed this
problem, and proposed several solutions[19]. They suggest
using cryptographic techniques to create dynamic hardware
addresses. One proposal requires a loosely-synchronised clock
to generate a guaranteed-unique local hardware address. At
time of connection to the network, the algorithm encrypts
the combination of a local network preﬁx, the true hardware
address, and the current time. The output remains IEEE
802 compliant, and would therefore work with any EUI-48-
supporting network interface. Other access protocols would
require similar dynamic hardware address techniques to pro-
vide unlinkability.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Digital Marketplace (DMP) is a call management ar-
chitecture which creates a freely-operating market in network
access. We propose to modify the DMP to allow some users to
access the network with complete anonymity. These changes
have no impact on other users who are content to be identiﬁed.
Our proposed changes are described above in section IV,
and can be summarised as follows:
1) Allow unsigned User Negotiation Agents (UNA) to
migrate from the user’s handset
2) Modify the Connect message to include the UNA
3) Require that the UNA portion of the Connect message
is padded to a ﬁxed length and encrypted to the MA
4) Pay for service in advance, using anonymous digital cash
micropayments
5) Ensure that the user’s local wireless network hardware
address is dynamically generated each session
Several properties arise from these changes. First, the user
no longer requires a long-term relationship with a service
provide in order to gain network access. Secondly, there is
no requirement for the user to reveal their identity to anyone
in order to gain network access. Finally, two separate network
access sessions cannot be linked together to build up a proﬁle
of any user. Therefore, this modiﬁed Digital Marketplace
enables a new form of anonymous communication: anonymous
network access.
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